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The longer-term effects of human capital enrichment programs on 
poverty and inequality: Oportunidades in Mexico*
Los efectos a largo plazo de programas de incremento en el capital humano 




Previous empirical research has shown that Mexico’s Oportunidades program 
has succeeded in increasing schooling and improving health of disadvantaged 
children. This paper studies the program’s potential longer-term consequences 
for the poverty and inequality of these children. It adapts methods developed in 
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and incorporates existing experimental 
estimates of the program’s effects on human capital to analyze how Oportunidades 
will affect future earnings of program participants. We nonparametrically si-
mulate earnings distributions, with and without the program, and predict that 
Oportunidades will increase future mean earnings but have only modest effects 
on poverty rates and earnings inequality.
Key words: Oportunidades, Human capital, Schooling, Health, Poverty, 
Inequality.
Resumen
La investigación empírica previa ha mostrado que el programa mexicano 
Oportunidades ha tenido éxito en aumentar la escolaridad y mejorar la salud 
de niños desfavorecidos. Este artículo estudia las potenciales consecuencias 
de largo plazo en la pobreza y desigualdad  que afectan a estos niños. Adapta 
modelos desarrollados por DiNardo, Fortin y Lemieux (1996) e incorpora es-
timadores experimentales existentes de los efectos del programa en el capital Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 68
humano para analizar cómo Oportunidades afectará los ingresos futuros de los 
participantes del programa. Simulamos de manera no-paramétrica las distri-
buciones de ingreso, con y sin el programa, y predecimos que Oportunidades 
aumentará los ingresos medios futuros pero sólo tiene efectos modestos en la 
tasa de pobreza y la desigualdad de ingresos.
Palabras clave: Oportunidades, Capital humano, Escolaridad, Salud, Pobreza, 
Desigualdad.
JEL Classification: H50, I00, J24, O12, O54, O15.
1.  Introduction
In recent years, governments in many Latin American countries have adopted 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs as a primary strategy for alleviating 
poverty and stimulating investment in human capital. These programs typically 
provide cash grants to poor families if they send their age-eligible children to 
school and subsidies for regularly visiting health clinics. Mexico and Brazil 
first adopted CCT programs in the 1990’s. Since then, programs with similar 
incentives have been introduced in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay1.
The Mexican Oportunidades program (formerly called PROGRESA) was 
rigorously evaluated using both experimental and non-experimental evaluation 
designs. In the first two years (1998-1999) of its implementation in rural areas, 
the program was evaluated using a place-based social experiment that randomized 
506 villages in or out of the program. The experimental results demonstrated 
statistically significant program impacts on increasing schooling enrollment 
and attainment, reducing child labor, improving health and nutrition outcomes 
and reducing poverty2. Partly on the basis of these observed positive program 
impacts, the Mexican government expanded the program into urban areas in 
2002. By 2005, the program covered five million families and had an annual 
budget of U.S. $2.1 billion. A non-experimental evaluation carried out in urban 
areas found statistically significant program impacts similar in magnitude to 
those found in rural areas.
As noted, previous evaluation studies of the Oportunidades program docu-
mented the program’s short-term impacts. This paper takes as a point of departure 
the observed impacts on education and nutrition and estimates the effects of 
these changes on the future earnings distributions of the children currently 
participating in the program. The question we consider is how the program’s 
1  Some similar programs also have been introduced in Asian countries, such as Bangladesh 
and Pakistan.
2  See, e.g., Schultz (2000,2004), Gertler (2000), Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2005), 
Parker and Skoufias (2000), Buddelmeyer and Skoufias (2003), Todd and Wolpin (2006) 
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impacts on human capital, as measured by years of schooling attained and 
increases in height (interpreted as an indicator of long-term nutritional status), 
will affect future earnings inequality and poverty of the younger generation. 
In the last decade, Mexico has ranked among the countries in Latin America 
with the highest income inequality. A study by Lopez-Acevedo (2004) finds 
that educational inequality accounts for the largest share of Mexico’s earnings 
inequality, suggesting that human capital enrichment programs could be an 
effective instrument for reducing inequality. Freije, Bando and Arce (2006) 
show that Oportunidades has significantly decreased the poverty rate among 
the current generation of recipients, but little is known about the longer-term 
effects of the program on poverty.
Our approach to simulating program impacts on earnings distributions 
adapts for use in program evaluation a nonparametric decomposition method 
originally developed in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and extends 
this method to allow for probability mass at zero in earnings distributions. 
Existing micro-simulation approaches for predicting effects of conditional 
cash transfer programs have focused on the short-term and are mainly based 
on parametric modeling frameworks3. The parametric models can be quite 
rich, but they typically impose strong functional form assumptions. The goal 
in microsimulation studies is usually to forecast the effects of programs prior 
to their implementation, whereas our aim is to understand how program im-
pacts that have already been estimated will affect future earnings and poverty. 
Our approach is fully nonparametric and does not impose any functional form 
assumptions on the earnings-height-education-work experience relationship, 
other than continuity and differentiability. We find evidence of nonlineari-
ties in the estimated relationship that shows the benefits of flexibility with 
regard to model specification. We use the nonparametric simulation method 
to compare the earnings and employment distributions with and without the 
program and to compare our inferences to those that would be obtained using 
more standard parametric approaches.
The key implications from the analysis are that the program’s impacts 
on education and height will increase mean future earnings of beneficiaries 
but will likely have little impact on earnings inequality. The modest overall 
observed impacts on inequality are attributable to two main factors. First, 
the program targets children from poor family backgrounds, and family 
background is an imperfect predictor of future earnings. Children from poor 
backgrounds ultimately get distributed throughout the adult earnings distribu-
tion due to substantial intergenerational mobility. Second, we find important 
nonlinearities in the relationship between earnings, education and height, the 
most notable being that the returns to education are greater for post-primary 
years of education. Such nonlinearities imply that people who would obtain 
higher levels of schooling in the absence of the program tend to benefit more 
from the intervention, which contributes to widening rather than lessening 
inequality.
3  See, e.g., Freije, Bando and Arce (2006) and Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2003).Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 70
Our empirical analysis is based on the first wave of the Mexican Family 
Life Survey (MxFLS-1) which was collected in 2002. The survey collected 
data for all members of 8,440 households and includes information about labor 
force participation, income for both primary and secondary jobs (including 
self-employment), education, and health. It also contains measures of family 
background, that we use to simulate program targeting. Our final analyses use 
a subsample of 5,171 individuals age 25 to 40.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two describes the nonparametric 
simulation method and how we adapt and use it to study how Oportunidades 
affects employment and the overall earnings distribution. Section three describes 
the Mexican Family Life Survey and our analysis samples. The empirical results 
are presented in section four. Section five concludes.
2.  Methodology for Simulating Program Effects on Population 
Earnings Distributions
The simulation method that we use to study program effects on earnings 
and employment outcomes is adapted from a wage decomposition method 
originally proposed in DiNardo et al.  (1996). Their study uses the method to 
investigate the effects of institutional and labor market factors on changes in 
the U.S. wage distribution over time. Their approach writes the overall wage 
density at time t,  fw t w = (| ) in terms of the conditional wage densities, where 
conditioning is on a set of labor market or institutional factors, z, whose effects 
on earnings they analyze:
   fw tf wz tf ztdz ww z z (| )( |, )( |) . =∫
In their study, z includes variables indicating union status, industrial sector, 
and whether the wage falls above or below the minimum wage. Counterfactual 
wage densities are constructed by replacing  fz t z(|)  by a different hypothetical 
conditional density, gzt z(|).
We apply the DiNardo et al. (1996) method to simulate earnings densities with 
and without a program intervention, where the program intervention changes the 
distribution of z. We extend the method to account for simultaneous analysis of 
both employment and earnings by permitting the earnings distribution to have 
a mass point at zero due to nonparticipation. In this section, we first describe 
the simulation approach in general terms, and then how it applies to evaluating 
the effects of the Oportunidades program.
2.1.  Basic method
Denote some outcome of interest (earnings) by y and define its density 
in terms of its conditional density (conditional on some observed charac-
teristics x):
   fy fyxd xf yxfxdx
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Suppose that the program intervention changes the distribution of x from 
f(x) to   fx ()  but that the distribution of y conditional on x stays the same 
 fyxf yx (|)( |) = ( ). The new unconditional distribution of y would be given 
by:
    fy fyxfxd x
x () (|)(). =∫
We wish to simulate the effect of the program intervention on the outcome 
y as it operates through changing x. For example, suppose that the variable 
x represents years of schooling attained and height and that the program 
intervention increases schooling attainment and height by some amount, 
i.e.   xx x =+ ∆ . Suppose also that we have a sample of size n drawn from the 
unconditional density, f(x). If we know Δx we can generate for each individual 
 xx iixi =+ ∆ . We can simulate the post-program earnings density   fy ()  at a 
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αy and αx are bandwidths that are assumed to satisfy the usual requirements for 
consistent kernel density estimation4.
The MxFLS data are a stratified sample, so sampling weights are required 
to reweight the sample back to population proportions. Incorporating sampling 
weights into the simulation method is straightforward. Assume each observation 
has a sampling weight, ωi, and that the weights are scaled so that  ωi n ∑ = . The 
weights can be incorporated into the estimation of   fy ()  as follows:


















4  We require ax → 0, ay → 0, as n → ∞ and ayaxn → ∞.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 72
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For expositional clarity, we suppress the weights in the remainder of the 
discussion, although we incorporate them in the estimation.
2.2.  Accounting for probability mass at zero
Kernel density estimation can approximate well the distributions of continu-
ous random variables, but in our data many people (especially women) report 
zero earnings. The program intervention could increase earnings among workers 
as well as change the probability of having positive earnings. We accommodate 
the mass point at zero in the earnings distribution by estimating the density 
of earnings as a mixture, where with some probability individuals earn zero 
and with the remaining probability they earn income drawn from the density 
of income conditional on its being positive,  fy y >0() . Both the probability of 
having positive earnings and the magnitude of earnings are potentially affected 
by the program.
Let   y  be the random variable representing the distribution of income implied 
by the counterfactual distribution of   x. Again, we assume the distribution of 
y conditional on x stays constant; in other words that the density of earnings 
conditional on schooling attainment and height is the same whether or not the 
program is in place. This implies that
  











The stability assumption implicitly rules out general equilibrium effects, 
because it assumes that increases in the population in schooling attainment or 
height do not affect the earnings premium for those characteristics.
We can obtain the probability of zero earnings, Pr() ,  y = 0  with the program 
intervention (under the counterfactual   fx () ) using the following:
   Pr Pr () (| )(),   yy xfxd x




























































In the last equation, 1(yi = 0)
 
is an indicator that denotes whether the indi-
vidual has zero earnings.
Let  
 fy y>0()  be the density of income conditional on its being positive. The 
counterfactual distribution of y conditional on y being positive is given by:
  






















































































We estimate the conditional densities at a point (y0, x0) using the standard kernel 












































































We now have all the ingredients to simulate the post-intervention earn-
ings distribution. Earnings is 0 with probability Pr()  y = 0  and is drawn from 
  
ˆ
() () . fy y y> > 0 0 with Pr
2.3.  Measures of poverty and inequality
After simulating the distribution of earnings with and without actual and 
hypothetical program impacts, it is possible to examine the effect of that the Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 74
program intervention has on poverty and inequality using standard measures 
considered in the poverty measurement literature. Below, we briefly summarize 
the measures that we use in the empirical analysis as functions of the estimated 
densities, taking into account that densities may have probability mass at zero. 
For a recent discussion of the relative merits of alternative poverty and inequality 
measures, see Foster and Szekely (2007).
Headcount Ratio. The headcount ratio is the fraction of the population below 
a predefined poverty line. Denote the value of the poverty line by L.
   HCR == +− = > Pr yP ry FL y () (( )) () | 01 0 0
Average Poverty Gap Ratio. The average poverty gap ratio is the mean shor-
tfall between an individual’s income and the poverty line (with those above the 
poverty line having no shortfall) expressed as a fraction of the poverty line:
   APGR == +− =
−





y () (( )) () | 01 0
0 0
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) Index. The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) 
index is a weighted version of the average poverty gap ratio that gives more 
weight to poorer individuals:
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Coefficient of variation. The coefficient of variation is a common measure of 
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Inter-quantile ranges. Another common measure of the dispersion of a distri-
bution is the interquartile range. The differences between quantiles of y can be 
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Gini Coefficient. The Gini coefficient is widely used as a measure of inequality 
of a distribution of income. Its values range between 0 and 1, with 0 correspon-
ding to perfect equality and 1 corresponding to perfect inequality (one person 
has all the income).
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Theil Entropy Coefficient. The Theil entropy coefficient can be computed 
from a set of observations by:














If everyone has the same (i.e., mean) income, then the index equals 0. If one 
person has all the income, then the index equals ln n.
Taking the limit as n → ∞, we get the following formula in terms of the 
density, conditional on y > 0:
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Generalizing this measure to the case where there can be probability mass 
at 0 gives the following:













Below, we report how the program affects each of these alternative measures 
of poverty.
2.4.  Applying the simulation method to evaluation of Oportunidades
We next describe how the nonparametric simulation method is applied in the 
context of evaluating Oportunidades. y represents labor earnings, and is mod-
eled as a function of three covariates: e denotes years of schooling attainment, 
h denotes height in centimeters (a measure of long-term nutritional status), and 
x denotes years of potential labor market experience5. The conditional density 
of labor market earnings is
5  The MxFLS data contain information on recent labor histories, but these are not long 
enough to construct a measure of actual experience. For this reason, we use the standard 
Mincer potential experience measure: Age minus years of schooling minus 6.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 76
   fyehx (|,,)
The overall income distribution integrates over the observed schooling at-
tainment, height and experience distribution in the population:
   fy fyehxd Fe hx
ehxA ehx () (|,,)( ,,).
(,,) ,, =
∈ ∫
The Oportunidades program is known to impact schooling attainment levels 
(e) and height (h) and we want to assess how these impacts translate into changes 
in the earnings distribution. If participation in the program was universal, we 
could nonparametrically simulate the effect of the program on the income 
distribution simply by augmenting schooling attainment and height values by 
the expected program impacts. Let Δe denote the expected impact on schooling 
attainment and Δh the impact on height.
   fy fyehxd Fe h
ehxA ehxeh () (|,,)(,
(,,) ,, =+ +
∈ ∫ ∆∆ ,, |( ,,)) . xe hx S ∈
Because nonparametric estimation methods do not extrapolate beyond the 
observed support (A), this simulation can only be performed for the subset of 
people for whom (, ,) , ehxA eh ++ ∈ ∆∆  which we denote by S.
The above equation assumes that everyone experiences a program effect 
of the magnitude (Δe, Δh), but Oportunidades was targeted to a subset of the 
population based on poverty-related criteria that are discussed in detail below. 
Let  D = 1 for the subset of individuals targeted by the program and D = 0 for 
those not targeted. The overall income distribution that results, g(y), reflects 
that of the combined targeted and nontargeted subgroups:
   gy Df yD () Pr() (| ) == = 00
   += = Pr() (| ) Df yD 11 
Suppose the nontargeted subgroup experiences no effect of the program6. 
The larger the subgroup targeted by the program (Pr(D = 1)), the larger will be 
the potential effect on the overall earnings distribution.
Using this methodology, we can explore the relative contribution of impacts 
on schooling attainment and height in changing the overall income distribution, 
by considering the case where (i) we set Δe = 0 and the only effect is through 
Δh, and (ii) where Δh = 0 and the only effect comes through Δe. Implementing 
the simulation estimator of the previous section requires nonparametrically 
estimating the conditional density  fyehx (|,,) and the unconditional density 
fehx ehx ,,(,,) .  We estimate the latter using a three dimensional kernel density 
estimator:
6  This assumption rules out spillover effects of the program onto the nontargeted population. See 





































where ae, ah and ax are the bandwidth choices. In our analysis below, we use a 
Gaussian kernel and apply Silverman’s rule for univariate distributions to each 
dimension of the data (Silverman, 1986). We also experimented with other 
bandwidth choices and found our main results were quite robust. To estimate 
the conditional density  fyehx (|,,), observe that the conditional density can 
be expressed as the ratio of two joint unconditional densities:







each of which can be nonparametrically estimated by standard kernel density 
estimators.
The convergence rate of pointwise nonparametric density estimators slows 
down as the dimensionality increases, a problem known as the curse of dimen-
sionality. However, the proposed estimators average over the nonparametric 
estimates and therefore converge at a faster rate.
3.  Description of the Analysis Subsamples
We analyze data from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS-1), which 
conducted interviews with 8,440 households in 150 communities in 2002. 
Every household member age 15 or older was interviewed, yielding about 
38,000 individual interviews. 16 of Mexico’s 32 states/districts are represented 
(roughly 70% of the population resides in these states). Weights are provided to 
make the sample nationally representative. The survey includes comprehensive 
information on employment and income for both primary and secondary jobs 
in the formal and informal sectors. The survey also includes information on 
household structure, education, and health. The key variables used in simulating 
counterfactual outcomes are income, employment, education level, height and 
labor market experience. Appendix A describes in more detail how we construct 
each of these variables from the data.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our two main analysis samples: 
Adult men and women age 25 to 40. About 10% of men and 64% of women 
report zero labor income. Mean monthly earnings for males are 3,945 pesos and 
for women 1,140 pesos, where the means include zeros for nonworkers7. The 
average education level for men is 8.8 years, which is about one year higher than 
the average for women of 7.7 years. Men are on average 166 centimeters tall, 
and women are on average 153 centimeters tall. The Gini coefficient for earnings 
7  In 2002 the average daily exchange rate was 1 USD equals 9.68 pesos. Because a small 
number of the the earnings values seemed to be outliers, we implemented a trimming 
procedure and omitted all individuals who reported income higher than 40,000 pesos/
month. This corresponded to 9 of 5,180 observations or the top 0.2%.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 78
of men is 0.483 and for earnings of women is 0.819. The higher coefficient for 
women reflects the fact that a large fraction of women in Mexico do not work, 
so the earnings distribution for women is more unequal than that for men8.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Men and Women, age 25-40
Men Women
Proportion with zero earnings 0.099 0.638




Median earnings 3.000 0.000
Interquartile range of earnings 3.300 3.600
Coefficient of Variation 1.123 2.276
Gini Coefficient 0.483 0.819
Theil Index 0.443 1.459
Headcount Ratio (FGT, α = 0)* 0.227 0.763
Average Poverty Gap Ratio (FGT, α = 1)* 0.148 0.702
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke Index (FGT, α = 2)* 0.126 0.681












Sample Size 1950 3221
* The three poverty measures are computed using poverty line of 1,452 pesos/mth (= 5 USD/day).
4.  Empirical Results
We use the methods described in section two to simulate the effect of the 
Oportunidades program on the earnings distribution as it operates through 
changing education and height levels of the younger generation. We infer the 
relationship between earnings, education, height and labor market experience 
from information on adults who are age 25 to 40 population and then use that 
estimated relationship to draw inferences about how increases in schooling 
and height would affect earnings distributions. Experimental evaluations of the 
Oportunidades program (as well as of its predecessor, the PROGRESA program) 
have found that the program increases schooling attainment levels by 0.6 years 
8  As a point of reference, most developed European nations tend to have Gini coefficients 
for household income between 0.24 and 0.36. For household income, the United States 
Gini coefficient is around 0.45 and for Mexico is 0.55 (in 2003).The longer-term effects of human capital / Douglas McKee, Petra E. Todd 79
on average and adds about one cm to height for both men and women9. We 
consider the following hypothetical combinations of impacts and their effect on 
the earnings outcome distribution: (a) an increase in schooling attainment of 0.6 
years, (b) an increase in height of one cm, (c) a combined increase in schooling 
attainment and height in the magnitudes specified in (a) and (b), (d) an increase 
in schooling attainment by three years, and (e) an increase in height of three 
centimeters. An increase of three years of education or an increase in height 
of three centimeters is a very large impact that is much greater than what was 
observed under the program, but we include these hypothetical impacts simply 
for purposes of comparison.
4.1.  Program targeting
Our goal is to simulate the longer-term effects of Oportunidades on earnings 
inequality and poverty. Ideally, we would compare two groups: The “treatment” 
group would be the population targeted as children by the program observed 20 
years later and the “control” group would be the same people in a world where 
the program did not exist. Unfortunately, we cannot currently observe either 
group. The program was implemented relatively recently (in the late 1990’s), 
so many of the children who participated are still too young to observe their 
longer-term labor market outcomes. Additionally, although we can observe 
which families are currently participating in the program, it is likely that children 
from today’s Oportunidades households may not themselves meet the program 
eligibility criteria as adults. In fact, one of the primary goals of the program is 
to reduce the intergenerational transmission of poverty.
Our simulation is therefore based on a synthetic cohort approach that assumes 
stability in earnings relationships for neighboring cohorts. In particular, it as-
sumes that individuals age 25 to 40 can be used to represent the future earnings 
of children in families currently participating in the program. We simulate the 
effects of Oportunidades by identifying the 40% of current 25-40 year-olds that 
would have been most likely to be targeted when young had the program been 
available, making use of the observed family background characteristics. We ana-
lyze the effects of the program by changing this group’s observed characteristics 
(education, height, and potential experience) in a way that is consistent with the 
impacts that have been measured in recent program evaluation studies.
The MxFLS-1 dataset does not contain information on all the criteria used to 
determine eligibility for Oportunidades, and in fact the exact eligibility criteria 
are not public. However, from program officials we have learned the approximate 
criteria and use the most closely related variables from the MxFLS-1 dataset to 
approximate eligibility. Specifically, we estimate a probit model for program 
participation using data on children (age 9 to 12) who are currently participating 
in Oportunidades as a nonlinear function of several variables: mother’s educa-
tion, father’s education, whether the household has indoor plumbing, and the 
number of children age 0-10 residing in the household.
9  See Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) for discussion of the impacts of PROGRESA on 
height, and Schultz (2000, 2004), Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2005) and Todd and 
Wolpin (2006) for discussion of impacts on years of schooling.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 80
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for these variables. In the sample, 37% 
of children participate in Oportunidades. The program is most active in the poorer 
southern states (Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Michoacan, and Puebla), where 31% 
of the children live. On average, the children in the sample have mothers with 
4.7 years of schooling attained and fathers with 5.2 years. Only 46% of these 
children live in households with indoor plumbing. Table 3 shows the estimated 
coefficients from the probit model for program participation10. As expected, 
parental education, indoor plumbing, and the presence of young children in the 
household are highly significant predictors of program participation.
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN TARGETING ANALYSIS
Children Age 9-12
Children age 9-12






Maximum of parents’ schooling 6.1
(0.22)
Household has indoor plumbing 0.46
(0.05)
Number of children age 0-10 in household 2.1
(0.08)
Lives in Poor Southern State‡ 0.31
(0.07)
Sample Size 1699
‡ Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Michoacan, or Puebla.
Next, we compute a propensity score (the predicted probability of being 
eligible and participating in the program) for each adult age 25 to 40 using the 
estimated probit model coefficients and measures of their family background 
(parental education, characteristics of the household when they were age 12, 
and an approximation of the number of children age 0 to 10 in the household at 
that time). Although the actual targeting of Oportunidades is based on several 
additional variables, we have to restrict the analysis to the subset available in 
the dataset for both children and adults, which fortunately includes the major 
10  The participation model is estimated only for children in rural and semi-urban areas, 
because in 2002 (the time of our data collection) the program had not been significantly 
extended to urban areas. The data contain information pertaining to interviews with the 
parents of 1,970 children age 9-12 in rural areas. After dropping observations with missing 
variables, we are left with 1,699 observations.The longer-term effects of human capital / Douglas McKee, Petra E. Todd 81
determinants of program eligibility. We classify the 40% with the highest pre-
dicted probabilities of participation as the “target group” and the remaining 
60% as the “non-target group”.
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED PROBIT MODEL FOR PROBABILITY OF PARTICIPATING IN 
OPOrTuNIDADES
Variable Coefficient  p-value
Mother’s schooling less than 6 grades (omitted)
Mother’s schooling 6 grades –0.624 0.000
Mother’s schooling 7 to 9 grades –0.914 0.001
Mother’s schooling 10 to 12 grades –1.286 0.006
Mother’s schooling 13 or more grades –0.652 0.264
Father’s schooling less than 6 grades (omitted)
Father’s schooling 6 grades –0.592 0.000
Father’s schooling 7 to 9 grades –0.836 0.000
Father’s schooling 10 to 12 grades –1.284 0.015
Father’s schooling 13 or more grades 0.317 0.453
Max parent’s schooling less than 6 grades (omitted)
Max parent’s schooling 6 grades 0.750 0.000
Max parent’s schooling 7 to 9 grades 0.916 0.000
Max parent’s schooling 10 to 12 grades 1.211 0.034
Max parent’s schooling 13 or more grades –0.370 0.551
Indoor plumbing –0.291 0.029
0 or 1 young children in household (omitted)
2 to 4 young children in household 0.139 0.160
5 young children in household 0.466 0.037
6 or more young children in household 1.159 0.023
Living in poor southern state‡ 0.257 0.201




‡ Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Michoacan, or Puebla.
Table 4 compares the characteristics of the target and non-target groups, 
separately for men and women. For both men and women, the target group has 
much lower maternal and paternal education levels. Individuals in the target 
groups also grew up with more young children in households that were much 
less likely to have indoor plumbing. For both men and women, there is a two 
year schooling attainment gap between the target and non-target groups as well 
as a two cm difference in height. The labor market experience measure we use is 
Mincer potential experience, which equals age minus years of education minus 
six. The target group has more experience under this measure, mainly because 
of having lower schooling attainment11.
11  The MxFLS data do not include years of actual labor market experience.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 82
TABLE 4




































































































Sample Size 867 1083 1629 1592
The mean levels in Table 4 shows that the target group is less advantaged 
than the non-target group. In particular, mean monthly earnings are 3,300 pesos 
per month for targeted men and 4,300 pesos per month for non-targeted men. 
Targeted women can expect about half (700 pesos per month) the labor income 
of non-targeted women (1,500 pesos per month). But there is still substantial 
overlap in the two earnings distributions, as shown in Figure 1. The top panel 
describes men’s labor income while the bottom panel describes women’s. The 
solid line in each panel is a nonparametric estimate of the density of positive 
earnings, while the two dashed lines correspond to the densities of positive 
earnings in the target and nontarget groups12. Again, the mean of the the target 
subsample is clearly lower than that of the nontarget, but a substantial proportion 
of the target group can expect to receive earnings above the population mean 
and a large proportion of the nontarget group receives very little income13.
12  The target density has been scaled by a factor of 0.4 and the non-target by a factor of 0.6 
so that together they add up to equal the total population density.
13  The fraction of men receiving no labor income differs very little between the target 
(11.4%) and nontarget (10.6%) groups, but the difference is actually quite large among 
women where 71% of targeted women receive no labor income compared to 58% of the 
non-target group.The longer-term effects of human capital / Douglas McKee, Petra E. Todd 83
FIGURE 1
DENSITIES OF INCOME FOR MEN AND WOMEN
Source: MxFLS 2002.
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4.2.  Simulating counterfactual distributions
We next use the estimated earnings-schooling-height relationships to simu-
late the longer-term effects of the Oportunidades program on labor income. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the nonlinearities in the density of non-zero labor 
income, conditional on schooling attainment and height; Figure 2 graphs the 
conditional density for men and Figure 3 for women. It is evident from the 
figures that higher levels of schooling attainment are associated with relatively 
larger increases in marginal earnings. The marginal earnings benefit is more 
homogeneous with respect to increases in height, but there also appears to be 
some nonlinearity near the upper end of the height distribution.
Tables 5a and 5b show the results of our main simulation experiments for men 
and women. The first column displays characteristics of the income distribution 
without any program impacts. This income distribution is equal to the original 
income distribution with the addition of a small amount of error introduced by the 
nonparametric smoothing. The other columns of Table 5a and 5b each represent 
a different set of hypothetical program impacts, given by (a)-(e), where we give 
the stated program impact to each individual in the target group and calculate the 
implied income distribution for the combined target and non-target groups. For 
example, case (a) augments each individual’s education level by 0.6 years. We 
use the nonparametric simulation method described above to simulate a coun-
terfactual earnings distribution whose features can be compared to the original 
no-program earnings distribution. As previously noted, we simulate changes in 
employment along with changes in the distribution of positive earnings. That 
is, the earnings distribution includes a mass point at zero for nonworkers and 
the fraction of nonworkers can be affected by the program. Monthly earnings 
are measured in thousands of pesos.
Table 5a indicates that the program would not significantly affect the fraction 
of men participating in the labor market, which remains around 90% across all 
the simulations. Also, impacts (a)-(c) have modest effects on mean earnings for 
men and almost no effect on earnings inequality, regardless of the measure. The 
effect of a 0.6 year impact on schooling attainment (in columns (b) and (c)) is 
larger for women than it is for men; however, the changes in income inequal-
ity are relatively minor for both men and women. The hypothetical three year 
increase in schooling attainment, shown in column (d), leads to substantially 
higher mean earnings and a reduction in poverty as measured by the Headcount 
ratio and the average poverty gap. While income inequality actually increases 
slightly for men, it declines somewhat for women due to the large induced in-
crease in female employment. A one cm increase in height leads to about a 30 
peso increase in mean monthly earnings for men but no substantial difference 
for women. The height impact has almost no influence on earnings inequality, 
but a large hypothetical increase in height of three centimeters slightly increases 
mean earnings and inequality, without having much effect on poverty.
Even though Oportunidades significantly increased the human capital of 
children from disadvantaged families and substantially raised mean earnings, 
we have found its effects on earnings inequality to be minimal for two main 
reasons. First, returns to schooling in this environment are highly non-linear 
and in particular, we observe increasing returns at higher schooling levels. 
Those individuals in the target group that would have higher educational at-The longer-term effects of human capital / Douglas McKee, Petra E. Todd 85
FIGURE 2
DENSITY OF MEN’S INCOME CONDITIONAL ON SCHOOLING AND HEIGHT
Source: MxFLS 2002
All densities are nonparametrically estimated using non-zero values of income.
tainment in the absence of the program experience relatively larger increases 
in income as a result of the program, so it is not the case that the poorest of the 
target group experience the largest benefit. The second factor that dampens the 
program’s effect on inequality is that targeting children from poor backgrounds 
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FIGURE 3
DENSITY OF WOMEN’S INCOME CONDITIONAL ON SCHOOLING AND HEIGHT
Source: MxFLS 2002
All densities are nonparametrically estimated using non-zero values of income.
We measure the influence of the nonlinearity in returns to schooling by 
estimating and simulating parametric models of the employment and earnings 
processes and comparing these results to those found in our nonparametric 
simulations. Tables 6a and 6b present estimated coefficients for a probit model 
of employment and a linear regression model of log earnings. Each model con-
tains a linear term for years of schooling and quadratics for height and potential 
experience. To simulate the employment process, we augment schooling attain-
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above and predict employment using draws from the probit error distribution 
that are consistent with the observed choices. To simulate earnings, we make 
the same augmentations to the human capital variables and for each worker 
incorporate the original earnings residual if it was observed and draw from the 
earnings residual distribution for those who were not working in the original 
sample. These simulation results are shown in Tables 7a and 7b.
TABLE 6A


























Sample Size 1950 3221
Pseudo R-squared 0.0145 0.0513
Standard errors are in parentheses.
TABLE 6B


























Sample Size 1720 1044
R-squared 0.1966 0.2712






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 92
Because there is near universal employment of men across the human capital 
distribution we find little effect of schooling and height on employment with a 
small positive effect of experience. The story is quite different for women where 
a year of schooling has a strong and significant positive effect on the probability 
of employment. When schooling is constrained to have a linear effect on log 
earnings, a year of schooling increases earnings by 8.7% for men and 15.4% 
for women. The linear and quadratic terms for height are jointly significant 
(α < 0.05 for both men and women while the experience terms are only jointly 
significant for women.
A comparison of Table 7a with Table 5a shows that for men, the parametric 
simulation approach tends to predict small reductions in inequality relative 
to the small increases in inequality predicted by the nonparametric approach. 
These differences are almost entirely due to the fact that the parametric model 
constrains log earnings to be a linear function of schooling and does not capture 
the fact that schooling has increasing returns. For women (Tables 5b and 7b) 
the parametric model predicts a smaller reduction in inequality because of the 
differences in how schooling affects employment. In particular, the nonparamet-
ric model predicts that targeted increases in schooling will increase women’s 
employment more than a parametric model that includes schooling as a linear 
term. This difference in the effect on employment overpowers the impact of 
imposing constant returns to schooling in the earnings process.
The second major factor explaining Oportunidades’ modest effect on in-
equality is that it targets children from poor families and these children are not 
necessarily the future poor adults. That is, the program increases the completed 
schooling of some children from an already high level to an even higher level. 
To explore the importance of targeting, we performed another set of simulations 
using our nonparametric earnings model where we target the same fraction of 
individuals with the program but choose them on the basis of low adult education 
levels. Specifically, we give the program to those who would otherwise form 
the bottom of the education distribution. This targeting is of course not feasible 
in practice, because it is impossible to know which children would eventually 
complete the least amount of schooling. Nevertheless, the simulation results 
reported in Tables 8a and 8b give an upper bound for improving earnings and 
inequality through more precise targeting. A comparison with Tables 5a and 5b 
shows that targeting individuals at the bottom of the education distribution would 
be more effective in reducing inequality than the current targeting mechanism, 
but at the cost of lower mean earnings, because it does not take advantage of 
the larger program impacts at higher schooling levels.
In addition to the simulations we report, which assume constant treatment 
effects, we also carried out all the simulations under alternative scenarios of 
heterogeneous program effects. For example, we assigned half the target popula-
tion impacts that were twice as high and half zero impact, keeping the average 
treatment effect the same. The half of the target group that received the double 
impact was alternatively chosen to be the less or more advantaged subgroup. Our 
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the heterogeneous treatment impact simulations were very similar to those 
discussed previously, so we omit them for the sake of brevity14.
5.  Conclusions
The Oportunidades program aims to reduce poverty of the current generation 
through transfers and to alleviate poverty of the next generation through human 
capital investment. A number of experimental and nonexperimental evaluation 
studies have documented that the program significantly improves schooling at-
tainment, health and nutrition over the short-term. This paper develops and applies 
a nonparametric simulation method for the purpose of studying how increases in 
schooling attainment and in height, as a measure of long-term nutritional status, 
will affect the distribution of earnings in the next generation.
Our empirical findings suggest that the human capital investment in today’s 
youth will increase their mean earnings levels, but will have only a modest 
effect on earnings inequality. Behrman (2006) comes to a similar conclusion in 
a survey of human capital policies and from an empirical study of how increas-
ing education affects earnings inequality in Chile. The key factors underlying 
the modest effects on inequality that we observe are the difficulty in predicting 
which children will become future low earning adults and nonlinearities in how 
health and education are priced in the labor market. With regard to the first 
factor, childhood poverty is a strong predictor of future low earnings, but there 
is also substantial intergenerational mobility that makes it difficult to target low 
adult earners on the basis of childhood characteristics. With regard to the second 
factor, we found evidence of important nonlinearities in how height and education 
influence earnings. Most notably, an additional year of secondary school has a 
higher monetary return than an additional year of primary school. Because of 
these nonlinearities, people at the upper deciles of the targeted population tend 
to benefit more from the program intervention.
We conclude by considering some limitations of the simulation method 
studied in this paper. First, the method assumes that the observed relationship 
between earnings and the covariates of education, height, and work experience 
is causal. This raises concern about potential bias due to unobserved ability, 
which is the subject of a large labor economics literature. Previous attempts to 
control for ability bias have relied mainly on instrumental variables or natural 
experiments (e.g. twins with different levels of schooling).15 Although there is 
variation in reported estimates, most estimates of the rate of return to school-
ing that purport to control for ability bias through the use of instrumental 
variables exceed those obtained by ordinary least squares. The variation in 
estimates is partly accounted for by heterogeneity in returns to education on 
earnings that requires a LATE (local average treatment effect) interpretation 
14  The estimates are available from the authors on request.
15  e.g., Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman (1994), Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), 
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of the instrumental variables estimates.16 Estimates that account for ability 
bias using variation in twin pairs, on the other hand, tend to be somewhat 
lower than cross-sectional OLS estimates. Because the literature finds that 
OLS estimates do not necessarily overstate the causal effect, we have no 
reason to believe that our nonparametric procedure necessarily overstates the 
true return to schooling attainment. Also, much of the instrumental variables 
literature operates within a parametric framework and does not easily allow 
for the nonlinearities in the earnings-schooling-height-experience relationship 
that we find to be quantitatively important. Nevertheless, further exploration 
of how the simulation method could be modified to account for unobserved 
ability and endogenous covariates would be useful.
A second critical assumption of the simulation method is the usual synthetic 
cohort assumption, namely that the characteristics of today’s 25 to 40 year 
olds, observed in 2002, are representative of the future adulthood of today’s 
children. Extrapolating from current trends, children today would likely attain 
more education than current 25 to 40 year olds in the absence of the program 
intervention. Our estimates indicate that the marginal effect of education on 
earnings is increasing in years of education, so overall rising education levels 
could lead the simulation to understate somewhat the impact of Oportunidades 
on earnings. Third, the simulation method does not account for the general 
equilibrium effects of increasing the education levels of a large segment of 
the future labor force, which would tend to decrease returns to education. Any 
decline, though, is at least partially mitigated by the fact that Mexico is an open 
economy. Fourth, this study focused on individual level earnings for men and 
women, although household-level earnings inequality may be more relevant to 
policy makers. It is also not clear how to interpret high income inequality in a 
group (like women) where a large proportion choose not to work, because they 
have a partner who provides enough money for the household. The simulation 
method could be extended to model household formation by incorporating a 
marriage outcome, where marriage opportunities and outcomes potentially also 
depend on variables influenced by the program. Our method could similarly be 
extended to account for the influence of improving human capital on internal 
and external migration.
Lastly, improvements in future earnings are only one of the long-term ben-
efits expected from the program. For example, there is a substantial literature 
documenting how upgrading mother’s education increases child test scores (e.g., 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994). Female program beneficiaries who choose not 
to work may be more effective mothers and may choose to have fewer children 
and to invest more in them. The simulation methodology in this paper could 
conceivably be extended to examine changes in fertility.
16  Card (1999, 2001).The longer-term effects of human capital / Douglas McKee, Petra E. Todd 97
References
Angelucci, M., G. De Giorgi, M. Rangel, and I. Rasul (2008). “Family Networks 
and School Enrollment: Evidence from a Randomized Social Experiment”, 
Working Paper.
Ashenfelter, O. and A. B. Krueger (1994). “Estimates of the Economic Return 
to Schooling from a New Sample of Twins”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 84 (5): 1157-73.
Ashenfelter, O. and C. Rouse (1998). “Income, Schooling and Ability: Evidence 
from a New Sample of Identical Twins”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
113 (1): 253-84.
Behrman, J. and J. Hoddinott (2005). “Programme Evaluation with Unobserved 
Heterogeneity and Selective Implementation: The Mexican PROGRESA 
Impact on Child Nutrition”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. 67, Nº 4, pp. 547-569.
Behrman, J., P. Sengupta and P. Todd (2004). “Progressing through PROGRESA: 
An Impact Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment”, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, forthcoming in Economic Development and 
Cultural Change.
Behrman, J. and E. Skoufias (2004). “Evaluation of PROGRESA/Oportunidades: 
Mexico’s Anti-Poverty and Human Resource Investment Program”, in 
Jere R. Behrman, Douglas Massey and Magaly Sanchez R, eds., The 
Social Consequences of Structural Adjustment in Latin America, book 
manuscript.
Behrman, J. (2006). “How Much Might Human Capital policies Affect Earnings 
Inequalities and Poverty?”, Working Paper.
Behrman, J., M. Rosenzweig and P. Taubman (1994). “Endowments and the 
Allocation of Schooling in the Family and in the Marriage Market: The 
Twins Experiment”, in Journal of Political Economy, volume 102, Nº 6, 
1131-1174.
Bourguignon, F., F. Ferreira and P. Leite (2003). “Conditional Cash Transfers, 
Schooling and Child Labor: Micro-Simulating Brazil’s Bolsa Escola 
Program”. World Bank Economic review 17 (2): 229-54.
Buddelmeyer, H., and E. Skoufias (2003). “An Evaluation of the Performance of 
Regression Discontinuity Design on PROGRESA”, IZA Discussion Paper 
Nº 827 (July), Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany.
Card, D. (1999). “The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings”. In Handbook 
of Labor Economics, Vol. 3A, edited by Orley Ashenfelter and David 
Card. (Amsterdam: North Holland).
Card, D. (2001). “Estimating the Return to Schooling: Progress on Some Persistent 
Econometric Problems”, Econometrica 69 (5), 1127-1160.
Chakravarty, S. (1990). Ethical Social Index Numbers. New York: Springer-
Verlag.
DiNardo, J., N. Fortin, T. Lemieux (1996). “Labor Market Institutions and 
the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach”, 
Econometrica, Vol. 64, Nº 5, pp. 1001-1044.
Foster, J., J. Greer and E. Thorbecke (1984). “A Class of Decomposable Poverty 
Measures”, in Econometrica, Vol. 52, Nº 3, pp. 761-766.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 98
Freije, S., R. Bando and F. Arce (2006). “Conditional Transfers, Labor Supply, 
and Poverty: Microsimulating Oportunidades”, in Economia, Vol. 7, 
Issue 1, 73-124.
Gertler, P. (2000). “Final Report: The Impact of PROGRESA on Health”, 
International Food Policy research Institute, Washington, D.C.
Lopez-Acevedo, G. (2004). “Mexico: Evolution of Earnings Inequality and Rates 
of Returns to Education (1988-2002)”, Work Bank Report Nº 19945.
Parker, S. and E. Skoufias, 2000, “The impact of PROGRESA on work, lei-
sure and time allocation”, October. Report submitted to PROGRESA. 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. <http://
www.ifpri.org/themes/progresa.htm>
Persico, N., A. Postlewaite, and D. Silverman (2004). “The Effect of Adolescent 
Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height”, Journal 
of Political Economy.
Rosenzweig, M. and K. Wolpin (1994). “Are There Increasing Returns to the 
Intergenerational Production of Human Capital? Maternal Schooling and 
Child Intellectual Achievement”, The Journal of Human resources, Vol. 
29, Nº 2, Special Issue: Women’s Work, Wages, and Well-Being (Spring, 
1994), pp. 670-693.
Schultz, T. P. (2000). “Impact of PROGRESA on school attendance rates in 
the sampled population”, February. Report submitted to PROGRESA. 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.
Schultz, T. P. (2004). “School subsidies for the poor: Evaluating a Mexican 
strategy for reducing poverty”, Journal of Development Economics, 
(Revision of June 2000 Report submitted to PROGRESA. International 
Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. <http://www.ifpri.org/
themes/progresa.htm>
Silverman, B. (1986). Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis. 
Chapman & Hall/CRC.
Skoufias, E. and B. McClafferty (2001). “Is PROGRESA working? Summary of 
the results of an Evaluation by IFPRI”, Report submitted to PROGRESA. 
Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, <http://
www.ifpri.org/themes/progresa.htm>
Strauss, J. (1986). “Does Better Nutrition Raise Farm Productivity?” Journal 
of Political Economy, 94, April, p. 297-320.
Strauss, J. and Duncan T. (1998). “Health, Nutrition and Economic Development”, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36 (2), 766-817.
Todd, P. and K. Wolpin (2006). “Assessing the Impact of a School Subsidy 
Program in Mexico”,with Kenneth I. Wolpin, American Economic 
Review, 2006, December.
Todd, P. (2004). “Technical Note on Using Matching Estimators to Evaluate the 
Oportunidades Program For Six Year Follow-up Evaluation of Oportunidades 
in Rural Areas”, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, mimeo.The longer-term effects of human capital / Douglas McKee, Petra E. Todd 99
APPEnDIx A
Construction of Samples and Variables
This appendix describes how each of the variables for the empirical analysis 
was constructed. The data analysis has three parts. First, we estimate a probability 
of participating in the Oportunidades program and use the estimated model to 
simulate program targeting for men and women between age 25 and 40. Second, 
we estimate nonparametrically the relationship between income, education, 
height, and work experience for men and women between age 25 and 40. Third, 
we compute the counterfactual income distribution under assumptions of how 
the program affects education, height, and work experience that are consistent 
with recent evaluations of short-term program impacts.
Sample Construction
The initial sample of MxFLS respondents between age 25 and 40 contains 
6,564 observations. When we drop the individuals who worked but did not report 
their income, the number goes down to 5,871. It drops further to 5,180 (79% of 
the original sample) when we drop those individuals who did not report their 
education or whose height was not measured. Finally, we drop an additional 9 
outlier observations for individuals who report receiving more than 40,000 pesos 
in the previous month. This leaves a final sample size of 5,171.
Construction of Variables
Income. Income is measured as total labor income earned (including net pro-
fits for the self-employed) in the previous month. It includes zeros for those 
individuals who don’t work. About 6% of individuals who reported working 
in the previous week are recorded as being “peasants on their plot”. 40% of 
these individuals report zero income in the last month. This seems plausible for 
subsistence farmers. Only 2% of other individuals who report working report 
zero income. Income is measured in thousands of pesos and in 2002 the average 
daily exchange rate was 1 USD = 9.68 pesos.
We do not use proxy reports on income, because it is not clear how to combine 
this data with the first-person reports and weight the data correctly. The proxy 
reports also have more missing data.
Schooling. The MxFLS collects the type of the last school attended and, for 
most individuals, the number of years that the individual completed at that level. 
We do not include years of “technical education” in our measure, because wage 
returns to technical education (based on our own linear regressions) are much 
lower than the returns of conventional schooling.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 1 100
Height. Height is not self-reported but instead is measured by trained survey 
personnel.
Experience MxFLS did not collect information on actual labor force experience, 
so we use the standard Mincer measure of potential experience equal to age 
minus years of schooling minus six.